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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
Financial leverage is am integral part of financial 
memagement and has some degree of influence, either directly 
or indirectly, upon nearly amy financial decision facing a 
firm. Because of this importamt role, effective mensuration 
of and accurate effectual relations relevant to financial 
leverage must be developed.
This paper offers a first step toward these objectives, 
Chapter 2 deals with different measures that have been sug­
gested for leverage and Chapter 3 concerns itself with 
theories about the effect of leverage on the cost of 
capital.
The discussions regarding both leverage measurements 
and cost of capital theories will be directed toward the 
objective of this paper: comparison between views.
A firm may be said to be levered vdien there are 
securities of ownership outstanding, which have different 
priorities of payment, and where smoe of the promised 
payments for the use of funds are of limited amount 
(so that if more than the limited amount is earned the 
holder of a different type of security benefits).
^Harold Bierman, Jr., Financial Policy Decisions 
(London: The Macmillan Company, ig70), p. 07.
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Or more simply,
Leverage may be defined as the employment of an asset 
or funds for which the firm pays a fixed cost or 
fixed return.
The case of farmer Jones represents a simple analogy 
exercising the underlying principles of financial leverage. 
If farmer Jones needs another horse and can get more work 
out of his neighbor Joe's horse than Joe can, both of them 
may be able to benefit. For example, if Joe can only make 
Trigger plow 50 acres a day and farmer Jones can get him 
to trum under 60, it would be possible for neighbor Joe to 
rent Trigger to farmer Jones at a set charge equal to the 
profits of 55 acres a day, giving both of them an extra 
5 acres profit.
Prom farmer Jones point of view, leverage would 
be the employment of Trigger for a fixed cost of 55 acres 
profit a day. As long as Trigger kept up the good work and 
plowed more than 55 acres a day the leverage would be called 
positive; below 55, however, it would be negative and farmer 
Jones had better hope that Joe is a friendly neighbor. The 
latter situation points out one of the main dangers of using 
leverage; althou^ there is a chance of esuming more throu^ 
the utilization of leverage there also exists the chance of 
being worse off if the return on borrowed funds does not 
exceed the fixed charges for their use.
^James C. VanHome, Financial Management and Policy 
(Sog^ewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 196b;, p. 547
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Chapter 2 
LEVERAGE MEASUREMENT
Whether or not a firm is leveraged is not the most 
important aspect of financial leverage, rather it is the 
effects upon the firm caused by leverage. Before any such 
effects can be dealt with, however, leverage must be quanti­
fied. This is not a simple task as will be made apparent 
in this chapter.
PROBLÎMS AND OBJECTIVES
There have been many different approaches sug­
gested for measuring leverage but none has been proven 
fully superior and up to the task of providing an adequate 
measurement of leverage for all situations. Appendix 1 
contains a list of 27 formulas which have been used by 
financial writers to measure leverage. The reason for this 
diversity is the complexity of the object measured aind the 
lack of a posited definition for it. Since a definition is 
closely related to the defining equation it mi^t be said 
that there are at least 27 definitions of leverage. These 
variations are made possible by numerous factors affecting 
leverage measurements such as taxes and whether the figures 
are based on book or market values, as well as the use of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
definitions designed to measure specific aspects of 
leverage or viewpoints of the measurer. Such a situation 
exists because no single measure of leverage, in a realistic 
or practical sense, can measure all aspects associated with 
leverage. Still such a definition of leverage, as demonstrated 
on pages 1 and 2, is possible if it can be made general enou^ 
to apply to most situations. By their very nature, however, 
such definitions prove of little or no use in the detailed 
objective world of actual physical mensuration.
As a result what is needed is either, (1) a workable 
leverage measure applicable in all situations, which seems 
impossible at this time, (2) a proven leverage measure for 
each different and definable circumstance demanding one, or
(3) some knowledge of the interrelationships between measures 
so that consistencies and inconsistencies can be identified.
The remaining portion of this chapter will discuss suggested 
leverage equations and several studies that have been applied 
to problems of their usage in an attempt to decide upon the 
best means of developing an acceptable and consistent lever­
age measurement system represented by one of the three courses 
of action just stated.
STUDIES CONDUCTED & MEASURES SUGGESTED
The most basic measure of financial leverage is a 
simple ratio of debt (D) to equity or common stock (S):
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The higher the value of the higher the degree of leverage 
within the firm.
Another basic measure of leverage, consistent with 
L-j, is the ratio of D to total capital (V) where V =D+ S:
D = D
^2 - T ” m r ?
This measure, unlike L^, will always satisfy the condition:
0 < Lg <  1. As a result it is often preferred for reasons 
of ease of handling. The relationship between these two 
equations would be:
I'l
h  = T T T 7
Although and Lg are used by many financial writers 
in many situations they are very basic and fail to include 
many variables and events associated with the degree of 
leverage. For this reason numerous other equations for 
measuring leverage have been suggested and studied in an 
attempt to develop one more suitable for real world situa­
tions.
Pearson Hunt has addressed himself to a portion 
of this problem by recognizing that there are two dif­
ferent, yet often confused, aspects of leverage.^ One,
Pearson Hunt, **A Proposal for Precise Definitions 
of ’Trading on the Equity* and ’Leverage*,” The Journal of 
Finance. Vol. XIV, No. 3, (September, 1961), pp. 3^7-386.
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termed trading on the equity by Hunt, concerns itself 
with the optimum capital structure of a firm through proper 
analysis of financial risk.^ The remaining, called lever­
age, deals with the effects of fixed charge securities on 
the earnings of a firm under conditions of a constant 
capitalization rate. According to Hunt these are really 
different aspects of the same thing, financial risk, 
resulting from different viewpoints of the measurer.
Trading on the equity is that seen by the financial maz$ger 
as he attempts to determine the correct or optimum pro­
portions of debt and equity in his firm's capital structure 
and leverage, as defined above, is that viewed by the 
investment analyst as he tries to determine the resulting 
earnings produced from the capital structure of a firm 
that has already been decided upon. Hunt's equations for 
each view are as follows:
Trading on the equity = ■ (as seen by
(balance sheet leveragje) the fin. manager)
lev.) ' m ?  ^ y e t )
Where: EBIT = eeimings before interest and taxes
D = debt capital 
8 8 cxmaan stock outstanding 
K̂ xc cost of debt capital
Briefly financial risk is the risk caused by the 
presence of fixed charges resulting from the use of debt in 
a firm's capital structure. It is discussed in more detail 
on page 30.
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In a later article commenting on Hunt’s efforts, 
Harold Dilbeck states his general agreement but offers 
several criticisms and modifications.^ He finds fault 
in Hunt’s measure of trading on the equity in that it 
attempts to measure the effect of trading on the equity 
rather than the act being defined. As a result he feels 
that trading on the equity should be measured by the pro­
portion of specified charge securities in a firm’s capital 
structure since it is defined in this manner. Dilbeck 
also criticizes Hunt for not giving a complete analysis 
of the effects of changes in the cost of debt and equity, 
both held constant in the latter’s trading on the equity 
measure. Finally he charges Hunt with the failure of 
stating the assumption that tax effects will only cancel 
out of the leverage ratio idien marginal and average tax 
rates are equal; an assumption that must be present for 
his analysis to be complete.
In reply to Dilbeck’s first criticism Hunt says,
I cannot accept Dilbeck’s suggestion that trading on 
equity be measured solely by the "proportion of 
specific charge securities in a firm’s capital struc­
ture" . . . debt ratios . . . are inadequate measures 
of the consequences of using fixed-charge securities, 
since the quantity of the fixed charges do not enter 
into the definition.
Harold Dilbeck, "A Proposal for Precise Definitions 
of ’Trading on the Equity’ and ’Leverage’: Comment," The
Journal of Finance. Vol. XVII, No. 1, (March, 1962), pp. 127-
2Hunt, op. cit.. p. 131.
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Regarding hia constant cost of debt and equity Hunt explained 
that his model was a simple one smd, even though not per­
fectly correct theoretically, it was so in regard to his 
conclusions. He did, however, recognize his error in not 
stating the assumption equating marginal with average 
tax rate but at the same time declared that, "In actual 
practice, I believe, it would be very rare for the marginal 
tax rate to change significantly from the average."^ Never­
theless Dilbeck*s criticisms have generally been accepted 
as valid and Hunt's measures have not acquired widespread 
approval. Still, this discussion has served to demonstrate 
that a leverage definition as well as the resulting measure­
ment is often determined in part by the user and his purpose 
of measuring leverage.
Another writer differentiating between aspects of 
leverage is Woods idio makes a distinction between capital 
gearing and leverage. "Gearing is a prerequisite for, and
in most cases actually results in, leverage; but a geared
2firm mig^t still experience no leverage at all." Basically 
this situation can occur due to the definitions given for 
capital gearing and leverage. For leverage to be present 
Woods states two requirements:
^Ibid.. p. 132.
2Ivan R. Woods, "Financial 'Leverage* and 'Gearing* 
in Perspective," The South African Journal of Economics. 
Vol. 32, (March, 1964), p. 28.
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(1) Â source of funds on which there is a fixed or 
limited charge paid for use.
(2) The borrower must earn a return on total 
capital not equal to the fixed charges on borrowed funds.
Capital gearing is in reality (1) above, simply the 
use of fixed charge ftands in the financial structure, and 
therefore if the return on total capital equals the return 
required on borrowed funds gearing is present but leverage 
is not.
There are two measures of capital gearing recognized 
by Woods:
(2) fiinnual amount payable in preferred charges' ' expected annual distributable profit
He goes on to show in an example, however, that neither 
is fully adequate in relation to leverage (i.e., the first 
can show identical gearing between two firms when they 
experience different leverage and the second can have the 
highest leveraged firm obtaining the lowest degree of 
gearing).
Next Woods compared five measures of leverage in 
regard to how well they were able to determine the degree 
of leverage in three hypothetical firms. The five measures 
were:
(1) The ratio of net rate of return on equity 
capital to rate of return (before interest, after tax) on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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total capital;
1, _________    net equity eamiags/equity
1 earnings before interest after tax/total capital
(2) The ratio of the net rate of return on equity 
capital to rate of return (before interest after deducting 
tax of 1-T) on total capital giving the rate of return on 
equity as if all capital were equity capital:
- r _____________ net equity eaminga/equity__________
2 (earnings 'before interest ft taxHi-lrj/toial cap.
= Ig where a firm has prior charge capital consisting of 
preference shares only.
(3) To determine the effects on equity earnings 
if total capital were increased by the issuance of more 
prior charge capital, use the ratio of the rate of return 
on new equity to the rate of return on old equity:
r = new equity eamings/equity3 old equity eamings/equity
(4) Ratio of the proportionate change in net equity 
earnings to the proportionate change in earnings before 
interest and after tax:
change in net equity earnings caused by change 
in earnings before interest after tax_____h = .  «gyjy , ,, ,change in earnings before interest after taxes 
earnings before interest after taxes
Since change in net equity earnings caused by change in
earnings before interest after tax equals change in earnings
before interest and after tax,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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T - eamiruM before interest after tax 
"4 “ net equity earnings .
(5) Ratio of the proportionate change in earnings
after interest before tax to the proportionate change in
earnings before both interest and tax;
change in earnings after interest before tax caused 
by change in earninfce before interest & tax 
r _ eainings after Interest before ttdT"
change in eamlnge before interest & taxes 
earnings before interest and tax
Since the change in earnings after interest and before tax,
caused by the change in earnings before interest and tax,
equals the change in earnings before interest and tax if
the tax rate is proportional,
T _ esumings before interest and taxes 
5“ earning after interest before tax.
If the tax rate changes with income this simplification 
will only hold if there is no preference capital.
Woods in deciding upon the most effective measure 
of leverage made a distinction similar to that of Hunt.
That is Ig and would be favored by the mamagement of a 
firm since they measure the effect of changes in the capital 
structure upon the rate of return on equity capital. On 
the other hand, an investor or financial analyst would
prefer L^, or in that the capital structure is fixed. 
Thus according to both Hunt and Woods the appropriate 
leverage measure is decided in part by the viewpoint of 
its user.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each of the five measures provided the same ranking 
of firms according to leverage for the three hypothetical 
firms with the exception of L5 concerned mainly with the 
effects of new equity eeimings rather than"normal leverage". 
Therefore as far as ranking of firms according to degree of 
leverage, measures , Ig, and would serve equally 
well.
"Factors which affect the degree of leverage include 
debt-equity ratios, net earnings for capitalization, interest 
charges and allowable deductions for tax purposes."^ Walters 
manages to get all of these variables into his measure of 
leverage represented by the equation:
L = 1 + equity f  ̂ - (i - tax rate) (debt chsurges) \aêst— ^—  ê )
Where e. = pro rata share of net earnings before 
interest assignable to the debt 
component of the capital structure
Using this measure the tax rate can or cannot have a large
influence upon L, depending upon e^. If the share of
eeumings available to the debt component is a great deal
larger than debt charges the tax rate will have little
effect.
In the case of measuring the effect of new financing
James E. Walter, "The Use of Borrowed Funds,"
The Journal of Finance. Vol. XXVIII, Wo. 2, (April, 1955), 
pp. l4o.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
on 1 the equation becomes;
1 = 1 + (1 - tax rate) (e^ -
e
where e = net earnings available for equity 
prior to new financing 
ep = additional charges before interest 
and taxes after new financing 
IL = additional interest charges with new 
2 financing
Walter ends by making a distinction between the 
measurement of leverage and that leverage which is correct 
for an individual firm. Even thou^ the equations may give 
an accurate measure of L, "Whether the degree of leverage (L) 
exhibited by a given company is reasonable or unreasonable 
is, within wide limits, largely a matter of individual 
judgement."^ Or in other words the degree of leverage 
will be determined by a management decision deciding upon 
the desired trade-off between risk and profit.
(1) Stock or balance sheet, (2) flow or income, 
and (3) conjoint or rate of return are three categories
2into which (Eiandhi classifies all measures of leverage.
These three categories encompass most of the previous measure­
ments presented by Hunt, Woods and Walter.
The first class, including measures based on both
^Ibid.. p. 145.
^J. E. S. Ghandhi, "On the Measurement of Leverage," 
The Journal of Finance. Vol. XXI, No. 4, (December, 1966),
pp. 715-726:=-------
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book and market values, acquires its figures either directly 
from the balance sheet or from recorded values determined 
in the market place. Measures in this category are character* 
ized by a fixed capital structure and consist mainly of 
simple debt to equity ratios.
Flow or income measures, making up the second class, 
recognize the fact that debt leverage imposes prior claims 
on income and strive to measure the ability of a firm's 
income flow to meet these obligations. Thus the typical 
measure is the ratio of debt charges (bond interest, pre­
ferred dividends, etc.) to the total income or excepted 
income before such charges or taxes are subtracted. Hunt's 
leverage measure, as well as Dilbeck's modifications of it, 
are in this category.
The third group, which would include Walter's 
measures and most of Woods' encompasses aü.1 conjoint or 
rate of return measures. Measurements of this type con­
sist mainly of the ratio of rate of return on equity 
(income - debt charges/equity capital) to rate of return 
on total capitalization (income/equity capital plus all 
debt capital). By considering different implications caused 
by tax laws several variations of this theme are possible.
Ghandhi narrowed down from 13 to 9 the number of 
leverage measures used in his test by eliminating those 
that by their very nature would provide consistent results 
with another measure already represented. Following this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the nine separate leverage measurements were used to deter­
mine the degree of leverage in two actual industries; (1) 
light engineering, machine tools, etc. (fairly stable) and
(2) beers, wines, etc. (complex and unstable). By performing 
a Spearman's coeficients of rank correlation test among the 
results of each measure within the two industry groups 
Ghandhi found a significeuit correlation between nearly all 
measured results in both cases, although those correlations 
for the stable industry were somewhat higher. Prom these 
results it is concluded,
. . .  that in most "normal" cases there is a suf­
ficient degree of stability in the critical variables 
so as not to cause substantial and significant incon­
sistencies among the various measures of leverage . . . 
Thus in practice in circumstances other than the most 
extreme it would appear to be a matter of relative 
indifference which measure were adopted. '
Even if this conclusion can be accepted the measure­
ment of leverage is far from being home free. The reason 
for this is the many variations of figures available to plug 
into leverage equations and the lack of any real agreement 
upon which one is the most appropriate. Several of these 
decisions areas follow:
(1) One of them is in relation to what values are 
to be used to represent debt and equity. Such elements 
can be portrayed by book value, market value or flow value.
hbid.. pp. 724-725.
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Book value figures come ri^t out of accounting 
reports and resultingly are subject to the effects of 
various accounting methods such as the practice of conser­
vatism which may result in valuations much different from 
what many would feel is the real worth. On the other hand 
book values are objective and most likely to be used by 
practical men.^
Market values are just what the name implies and 
are obtained from the public's opinion, via market 
activities, of elements related to the firm. Usually, 
due to variations, these figures are represented by a 
calculated average of several values recorded over a certain 
time period. Market values have the advantages of giving 
some indication of the future value of elements as seen 
through the eyes of the general public and of eliminating 
problems of conservative evaluation present with book 
value. Still market values are not always as readily 
obtainable as book values and for some figures impossible 
Also, as will be recognized in the next chapter, the use 
of market value debt-equity ratios may be inappropriate as 
a leverage measurement relating to financial risk due to 
the possible introduction of a bias.
Flow measures refer to either the cash or income
^Bierman, Financial Policy Decisions, p. 90.
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flows of a firm over a period of time and hence are classi­
fied as dyziamic rather than static. A flow measure of 
leverage compares that portion of income or cash flow 
relating to debt with that associated with equity. Such 
measures are valuable in that they do not require, as is 
the case with book and market values, a rate of interest 
in computing the present value of debt or equity. Plow 
measures, however, provide a much better measure of the 
ability of a firm to meet fixed debt obligations than they 
do of other aspects of leverage. As a result they are 
used for this purpose much more than they are as determiners 
of the overall leverage in a firm.
(2) The classification of preferred stock as debt 
rather than equity and its effect on leverage needs some 
discussion. How preferred stock effects leverage is deter­
mined by whether or not it is cummulative. If it is non- 
cummulative and dividends are not issued in year one, 
leverage in year two will be increased ceteris paribus 
since the debt from preferred in year one has been free.  ̂
Preferred stock can also affect leverage comparisons 
between firms because of tax laws. Preferred dividends 
are not tax deductable while ordinary debt interest pay­
ments are. Therefore if two firms have the same expected
^Wood3, "Financial *Leverage* and 'Gearing* in
Perspective," p. 28.
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income (X), and total debt (D), consisting of preferred 
stock and bonds, their actual leverage may be different. 
This will be the case whenever the percentage of pre­
ferred stock in D differs from one firm to the next.^
For purposes of measuring leverage, preferred stock 
can be classified as debt, but if leverage is to be used 
as an indicator of financial risk it cannot since ordinary 
debt and preferred stock represent different risks in that
one always has to be paid for and the other doesn't under
2certain conditions.
(3) ■ Another decision area is whether or not to 
include short-term loans in the total debt when measuring 
leverage; the trend has been not to. "One of the most 
widely used classical definitions of leverage is long-term 
debt divided by long-term debt plus stockholders' equity."^ 
According to Woods many feel that the use of only long-term 
debt is adequate since short-term debt often has no interest 
charges, fluctuates widely over time and represents such 
a small portion of all debt. He favors inclusion of short 
term debt and discards such arguments because they imply
^Ghandhi, "On the Measurement of Leverage," pp. 717*718.
2Alexander Barges, The Effect of Capital Stziicture 
on the Cost of Capital (Englewood bliffs, kew Jersey: 
PrenticeJall, Inc., 1963)7 p. 35.
^Bierman, Financial Policy Decisions, p. 87.
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interest charges are necessary for leverage (actually debt 
with no interest or free debt gives greater leverage) and 
are only excuses for eliminating problems in the measure­
ment of short-term debt.^
Besides these problems there are other less 
frequent difficulties which must be faced such as how to
compare leverage between two firms if one leases and the
2other buys and how to account for possible accelerated 
effects on leverage from subsidiaries.^" For example, what 
is the real leverage of firm A who holds shares of levered 
firm B who in turn holds shares in . . .
CONCLUSIONS
Due to all of these measurement problems and the 
complex and varied situations they attempt to measure,it 
is apparent that the art of measuring financial leverage 
has not yet satisfied any of the three possible objectives 
stated on page 3. At present it appears that some combin­
ation of objectives 1 and 2 will provide the best chances 
for obtaining an accurate index of leverage. That is, 
several measures or groups of measures for different puarposes 
and a knowledge of their inter-relationships in the form of
^Woods, ’’Financial ’Leverage* and 'Gearing* in
Perspective," p. 35.
^Ibid.. p. 34. 
^Ibid.. p. 27.
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advantages and disadvantages of each measure. Several 
measures should be used in conjuntion, especially if there 
are unstable or extreme values present, and such measures 
should be chosen so as they are not mathematically consistent 
with one another by form. In elementary, uninvolved lever­
age situations, however, there is enough correlation between 
measures of leverage that almost anyone of them will suffice.
Through this practice and further research and 
study, it is hoped that one of the three objectives can be 
fully met and the problem of measuring leverage settled. 
However, even if some solution is reached to all the problems 
of leverage mensuration, there will still be numerous un­
settled questions regarding leverage, particuleurly as it 
effects financial management. Some of these are considered 
in Chapter 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 3 
LEVERAGE EFFECTS
Leverage can be charged with having some effect, 
either direct or indirect, upon nearly every aspect of 
financial management. This paper will deal only with the 
direct effect upon the cost of capital in a static sense.
COST OF CAPITAL
When reading the views of financial theorists,it 
seems as if the effects of leverage on a firm's cost of 
capital has developed into the crux criticorum of modem 
finance. The reason for this puzzlement and lack of a 
positèd theory lies with the yet impossible task of deter­
mining the interrelationships of many both objective and 
subjective and significant and picayune variables. Still, 
even with these problems, and perhaps because of them, 
financial theorists have generally narrowed the problem 
down to three major theories describing the effect of 
leverage on the cost of capital.
Before studying these theories it is proper to dwell 
briefly on the term, cost of capital. If capital is,
. the total of net worth, plus the long-term sources
21
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funds such as bonds and intermediate-term l o a n s . t h e  
cost of capital becomes the sum total of the costs of these 
separate sources. Included would be bonds, preferred 
stock, common stock, retained earnings and convertible 
securities, all possibly having a different cost and con­
tribution to the total cost of capital. Bach of these 
separate components have problems suid controversies of 
their own concerning which method gives the best estimate 
or measure of their individual cost. Since it is not the 
purpose of this paper, thankfully, to study measurement 
problems relating to cost of capital elements,it is only 
noted at this time that disagreements and hence possible 
inaccuracies do exist. Therefore, the same can be said 
of the total cost of capital figure obtained by combining 
these components.
The most common method of arriving at a cost of 
capital value when a condition such as this exists is to 
calculate a weigpbted-average cost of capital (K^). Since 
this measure and limitations inherent with it are part of 
the controversy in regard to leverage's effect on K^, it 
will be explained in order that it may be included in a 
more meaningful fashion.
The weighted-average cost of capital is simply the
^Gilbert W. Cooke and Edwin C. Boraeli, Business 
Financial Management (Boston: Hou/diton Mifflin Oomoanv.
1967), p. B. -----
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sum of products obtained when the percentage amounts of 
each capital component of total capital are multiplied 
by their respective costs. To demonstrate, assume that 
a given firm had the following capital structure occurring 
in the proportions given and at the coat stated for each 
component I
# amt. # cost weifgited cost
convertible securities È0 13.3 ■. 2.60bonds 20 6.5 1.30preferred stock 10 7.5 .75common stock 30 12.0 3.60
retained earnings 20 15.0
Eg = T 0 ?
Cost of capital figured for the firm as a weighted^verage 
of the five individual capital elements equals 11.25#.
One assumption of this method, limiting its use, is 
that future financing occurs according to the same pro­
portions of capital components in the capital structure 
used to measure cost of capital. If not, the actual cost 
of capital after such financing, unless it is recalculated, 
will differ from that measured by the former weighted-aver­
age.
The question of book value versus market value 
figures is present with the wei^ted-average cost of capital 
measure just as it was in the previous chapter with leverage 
measures. The use of both for measuring the cost of capital 
will understandably produce unequal results if market values
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differ from book values.
It is known that leverage can directly influence 
individual cost of capital components but the real issue, 
which as yet has not been proven, is whether or not lever­
age influences the weighted-average cost of capital
As recognized by Solombn, there are two ways of 
studying the problems of financial structure, dynamic and 
static.^ The former concerns itself with efforts to achieve 
optimal individual financing decisions throu^out time and 
the financial structure existing at any one time is simply 
a result of these prior decisions. The static view, used 
in this paper, places the capital structure decision at a 
point of time in the drivers seat with the goal of deter­
mining the optimal capital structure, given the prevailing 
market conditions. The major decision involved in the 
search for this optimum concerns the degree of leverage and 
resulting risk and how they relate to the cost of capital. 
There is much disagreement, as will be seen shortly, as to 
the exact nature of this relationship^and in fact some 
interested parties claim that there is no relationship at 
all.
The next question that must be answered is why the
^Ezra Sol<mùn, The Theory of Financial Mamgement 
(New York; Columbia tMiversity Press, p. Si7
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leverage-cost of capital controversy is important. It is 
essential because of the role it plays in major fields of 
finance such as capital budgeting, dividend policy and 
market valuation.
Capital budgeting decisions often depend to a 
large extent upon a firm's cost of capital and any factor 
which can influence this figure becomes important in the 
capital budgeting decision process. Such a decision, for 
example, could be strongly affected by whether one felt 
that increased leverage, caused by a new investment financed 
by debt, would increase a firm's cost of capital or have 
no effect upon it.
Dividend policy is related to the cost of capital 
because of its relationship with two major sources of funds, 
debt and retained earnings. By restricting dividends and 
using retained earnings for financing, a firm can get by 
with a lower degree of leverage. The question is whether 
this lower leverage results in a lower cost of capital 
or higher market value than would be the case if dividends 
were paid and debt incurred.
The market value of a firm is very closely related 
to its cost of capital. The cheaper it can acquire its 
capital the more profits it can accumulate and the higher 
should be its market value.
Analysis in this paper, however, will concern itself
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only with the basic relationship between leverage and the 
cost of capital and not with how this affects additional 
variables.
COST OP EQUITY
During most of the remaining portions of this paper 
for the purpose of simplicity the cost of capital will be 
thou^t of as the wei^ted-average of only two components, 
cost of equity (K^) and cost of debt (K^). How leverage 
effects Kg, which can also be viewed as the rate of return 
required by common stockholders on their investments, is 
therefore an important factor in the leverage-cost of 
capital relationship.
To study this connection the following equation 
measuring the cost of equity for a levered firm will be 
employed:
V = earnings available to common stockholders 
^e outstanding stock
g , (KBIT - K^ X D)(1 - T) + K^(D)
e ------------------------------
Using this equation it can be demonstrated how the degree 
of leverage, coupled with the earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT), effects the cost of equity or return required 
by stockholders.
Considered in the first situation will be a moder­
ately leveraged firm having total capital (V) of $100,000
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consisting of $70,000 in conmon stock (3) and $30,000 in 
debt (D). Cost of debt and the tax rate (T) for this and 
the following examples in this section will be given as 
and 50^ respectively. Income before interest and 
taxes is $10,000, Substituting into the above equation:
(1 ) K, .  C1P,P°0^ ,,..06 .
Kg = 8,4^
Now by changing the debt-equity ratio to 75?S debt 
the effect of higher leverage on Kg will be shown. To 
accomplish this it is assumed that the firm purchases 
$45,000 of its own stock on the market and increases its 
debt by an equal amount, keeping total capital the same,
(10.000 - ,06 X 75.000) (1-,5) + (,06 x 75.000)(2) Kg = ™ 7 5 ,'üüü‘-------^ ^
Kg = 29,095
Due to the increased amount of leverage the stockholders, al­
though there are fewer of them, have demanded a larger rate of 
return on their investment. Before the leverage effects on Kg 
can be absolutely determined, however, another factor must be 
considered. This is the earnings variable. To view the 
effects of EBIT on Kg the same equation and leverage situa­
tions as used just previously will be utilized. For the first 
case the moderate or 3095 debt level is assumed, but EBIT is
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given as $5,000 rather than $10,000.
(3 ) K, = (? .° °0  -  .06 X 1 , 0 6 x ^ 0 , 0 001
Kg = 4.9^
So in comparison with example (1) with the same debt-equity 
ratio, the cost of equity has decreased as EBIT decreased.
To see how a hi^ily leveraged firm is affected 
under similar circumstances the debt-equity ratio is changed 
to 75% D in the same manner as it was accomplished between 
examples (1) and (2), keeping all other variables the same.
(4 ) K, .  (? .°0 0  -  .06 X (-06 x 7^,000)
Kg = ^9.0%
Again as leverage increases so does Kg.
The results of these four examples are summarized 
in the table below;
low EBIT 
($5,000) high KBIT ($10,000)
low leverage 
(V is 309t D)
Kg = 4.9^ Kg = 8.45c
h i ^  levezage
(V is 75% D)
Kg = 19.0?t Kg = 29.O5C
Thus as leverage is increased so is cost of equity, 
The reason for this is that stockholders demand a hi^er 
rate of return on their investment as the financial risk 
of the firm is increased. The EBIT factor also has a
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direct effect upon as would be expected. The higher 
the earnings the more return stockholders will demand. 
Therefore the higher the leverage and EBIT of a firm the 
higher will be its cost of equity.
Throu^out this analysis the cost of debt capital 
has remained constant for each degree of leverage. Many 
theorists, however, picture as an increasing function 
of leverage and this will be discussed later in conjunction 
with the cost of capital theories.
RISK
As mentioned previously, along with additional chances 
of gains increased debt leverage also brings additional 
chances of losses. This risk can be statistically calcu­
lated.^ To demonstrate, the probability of a loss occurring 
for situation (1) in the section just prior can be figured 
if the mean and stemdard deviation (r) of expected EBIT are 
known. Assuming they are $10,000 and $3,000 respectively 
the following data exists:
EBIT (mean of probability dist.) = $10,000
r  standard deviation * $ 3,000
K^ cost of debt =
D'^debt = $30,000
Zp random var. from std. norm. dist.
Given the following equation:
^Bierman, Financial Policy Decisions, p. 95<
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M) 2 = -^d ^p —
Zp = (10.000 ; m  ̂  30.000)
Zp = 2.73
From a random normal table it is determined that with a 2^ 
of 2.73 and D amounting to $30,000 the firm has a .003 
probability of loss.
Moving on to example (2), however, with D increasing 
to $75,000 Sind all other factors remaining constant, the 
probability is greatly affected.
7 _ (10.000 - .06 X 75.000)_ 3,boo
Zp = 1.83
Consulting the table once again, the probability of loss 
under the increased leverage has jumped to .034, or nearly 
twelve times what it was under lower leverage conditions.
It is because of this increase in the chances of suffering 
a loss as leverage is increased that most theorists picture 
the yield on stockholders' equity as a positive function 
of the amount of leverage.
At this point it is appropriate to mention char­
acteristics of the types of risk that the employment of 
leverage entails. There are two basic types of risk in 
the financial world Miating to leverage, business risk 
(BR) involving the basic operational activities of the firm, 
and financial risk (PR) having to do with the firm's financing
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decisions. All firms have some degree of business risk 
but all need not have financial risk. Why? No firm, no 
matter what its business, is absolutely certain of its 
future income and without this indubitable degree of 
reliability some business risk is present, since it connotes 
dispersion in the firm's expected net income. And since 
business risk, is defined as ". . . the relative dispersion 
of the net operating income . . there is business risk 
in all firms (i.e., all those not having 100g( certain 
incomes is assumed to encompass all firms). If some case 
where such a hig^ level of certainty did exist, there would 
ho longer be a problem concerning financing. "If returns
are completely certain then it is a matter of indifference
2to stockholders how the fizm is financed."
For purposes of this paper financial risk will be 
determined by the degree of leverage ,so conoaivably a firm 
with no debt will have no financial risk. "Financial, risk 
is the additional risk to stockholders which strises throu^ 
the use of borrowed funds for the financing of a project 
and is usually measured by leverage."^
VanHome, Financial Management and Policy, p. 18.
OStephen J. Tumovsky, "Financial Structure and the 
Theory of Production," The Journal of Finance. Vol. XXV,
No. 5, (December, 1970), p. 1064.
^Ibid.. p. 1064.
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The justification of this view is presented in the 
following discussion differentiating between 3R and PR.
Risk can be measured by the relative distribution of expected 
income and in relation to financial risk this income is the 
return to shareholders. The statistical measure for rela­
tive distribution is the coefficient of variation (CV) which 
is equal to the standard deviation of a distribution divided 
by the expected value of the same distribution 
Using the CV in an example will demonstrate how business 
risk differs from financial risk and how debt leverage 
causes finahcial risk.
Por this example three firms X, Y and Z are consid­
ered, all having expected net income earnings on assets
equal to $10,000 with a standard deviation of $3,000. These
firms are assumed to be identical in all aspects except for 
the degree of debt; X having 0, Y having $3,000 and Z $7,000.
Since business risk is the relative distribution of 
income which is measured by the CV, it cem be represented 
by the equation
BR = .Ç-
and would equal for firms X, Y and Z;
^VanHome, Pinancial Management and Policy, p. 146, 
2Barges, The Effect of Capital Structure on the
Cost of Capital, p. 17.
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BB = = -300C
Thou^ the business risk for all three fims is 
equal, their financial risks are different due to varying 
fixed charges on debt which must be subtracted from net 
income from assets. Pinancial risk is measured by the 
relative dispersion of income belonging to shareholders. 
If debt charges (K^) are fixed at 4^ for all outstanding 
debt (D), the equations representing financial risk for 
the three firms are as follows.
Firm X -
t - (Kg)(D)
= 10,^6o°- 0
PRjj = .3000
Thus in the case of a debt free firm having no leverage,
PR seems to equal BR. This, however true, is not the real 
case, rather the PR equation above is really a measure of 
total risk (BR + PR) and when PR = 0 the total risk of a 
firm ceteris paribus will equal business risk. In fact PR 
can be defined as BR plus any additional risk of insolvency 
caused by debt charges.
Firm Y -
3.000
“ 10,08'ü - |VÜ4)ü.00S)
FR = .3036
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Firm Z -
3.000
= roTTO' - T.STTrr,w)
FRg = .30386
As expected the financial risk and leverage of a 
firm are directly related; as one increases so does the 
other. This relationship between financial risk and 
leverage is represented more clearly by Graph 1 on page 35 
for two values of <r— and K^. As can be seen, the slope of 
the PR line is determined by and its height above the 
0 axis by . Also in either case the FR line represents 
the total sum of business and financial risk and is in a 
direct linear relationship with leverage measured by debt/ 
common stock. The fact that there is this relationship 
between financial risk and leverage and none between lever­
age and business risk will play an important part in the 
next section where leverage and its effects, if any, on 
the cost of capital are studied.
It must be noted that it is only in the static sense 
that business risk and leverage have no relation. It is a 
well accepted fact that firms having low levels of business 
risk can carry financial structures much more leveraged 
than can firms associated with higher degrees of business 
risk,
, , , the reaction of both borrowers and lenders of 
funds to the circumstance of low external risks 
[e,g, utilities] brings about an optimum capital
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PR and BR as a Function of Leverage*
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*Calculations in Appendix 2.
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structure which is relatively heavily leveraged . . .
On the other hand, an industrial firm— facing heavier 
external risks— is likely to experience a relatively 
sha^ rise in financial charges if its debt-to-equity 
ratio (leverage) exceeds certain proportions . . .
Thus the typiceü. industrial financial structure would 
tend to contain a smaller proportion of debt to total 
financing than either the utility or the bank.1
PRESENT THEORIES
Theories regarding the effect of leverage on the 
cost of capital can generally be classified into three 
categories: (1) net income (NI), (2) net operating income
(NOI), and (3) traditional. The NI theory has few pro­
ponents but the remaining two have strong and persuasive 
supporters. In a sort of capsule description NI and NOI 
theories seem to occupy the end locations in a range of 
possibilities with the traditional theory situated some­
where between, in a somewhat compromising position.
Each of 'these theories will be presented in turn 
before dealing with criticisms of each and their differences 
and similarities.
NI Theory
The net income approach (named by Durand in 1952 
and again in 1967 by Weston as, unfortunately, the theory 
of traditional business finance) professes belief in a
^Eli Schwartz, "Theory of Capital Structure," The 
Journal of Finance. Vol. XIV, No. 1, (March, 1959), p.
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declining overall cost of capital as leverage is in- 
1 2creased. * The crux of this theory is that cost of debt
(K^) and cost of equity (Kg) remain constant throughout
all levels of leverage. This and the following theories
will be demonstrated by using a numerical example followed
by a graphic representation of the relationship between
leverage and cost of capitaLl. Leverage will be measured
by a simple debt to equity (D/S) ratio. Given a firm with
net operating income (NOI) of $1,00C^ outstanding debt (D)
of $4,000 and a K^ of 55̂  and Kg equal to lOjC.
NOI 1,000
less (K^)(D) 200
earnings available to stockholders 850"
K .10m&rket value of stock tJ,000
D added 4.000
market value of firm 12,b00
Calculating cost of capital by the equation:
^o *" market value 
K. = 1.000
» Igfooo
K, = 8.33î<
David Durand, **The Cost of Debt and S^uity Funds 
for Business: Trends and Problems of Measurement,** Con­
ference on Research in Business Finance (New York: National
Bureau of Scononic Research, 195%), pp. 215-217, reprinted in Headings in Canteenorary Financial Management, ed.
Keith B. jmild JB. Fiàdlïéy,~nTlig6TÏÏ; Scott,
Poresman and Company, 1969), p. 385.
oFred J. Weston, **Valuation of the Firm and its 
Relation to Financial Management, ** (MeKinsey Foundation for 
Management Research) printed in Financi^ Beaearoh euad 
Management Decisions, ed. Alexander À. kobiciiek, (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 14-15.
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Next in order to view the effect of a change in 
leverage asaume that D is increased to $7,0C0 accompanied 
by the repurchase of $3,000 worth of outstanding shares 
keeping total capital (V) the same as in the previous 
example.
NOI 1,000
less (K,)(D) 350
earnings available to stockholders o50
K .10
mSrket value of stock 6,S0o
D added 7.000market value of firm 13,500
Calculating K^:
1.000 
^o - T T Î W
Kq = 7.41*
Thus under NI theory the cost of capital decrease 
as the amount of leverage is increased. A graphic repre­
sentation of this theory appears below.
As can be seen continues to decrease, as lever­
age increases, until the point of optimum financial struc­
ture is reached where leverage is as high as possible.
The reason for K^'s decline is that is viewed as less 
than Kg and as D/S increases more of the lower priced D 
funds are substituted for hi^er priced S funds resulting 
in a decreasing function.
The implications of this theory are that K^ will 
continue to decline with leverage on into infinity. Most 
theorists, however, realize this is not possible as stated 
by Durand,
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NI Theory 
Leverage and Cost of Capital
D/S
. . . such a relationship cannot continue indefinately, 
. . .  As the debt burden becomes substantial, the bonds 
will slip below par, and the stock will cease to be 
worth ten times earnings.'
If this should happen, however, the risk as viewed by
investors would be greater and and would increase,
driving up K^. But as noted by VanHome,
. . . the critical assumption for NI theory is that 
the firm does not become increasingly more risky in 
the minds of investors and creditors as the degree 
of leverage is increased.
^Durand, "Costs of Debt and Equity Funds for Business: 
Trends and Problems of Measurement," p. 386.
^VanHome, Financial Management and Policy, p. 150.
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This assumption understandably is one that cannot be 
generally accepted amd as a result supporters of this view 
are nearly nonexistent.
NOI Theory
Moving to the opposite extreme,the next position 
viewed will be the net operating income theory. This 
method capitalizes a firm’s net operating income with the 
use of an overall capitalization rate or cost of capital 
which is stated as constant throughout all levels of 
leverage.
If Kq is given as 10̂ , this approach can be demon­
strated mathematically using the same example as with the 
NI method just prior. Starting with debt equal to $4,000.
NOI 1,000
K .10market value of the firm 10,ÔÔÜ
less market value of D 4.000
market value of stock 5,000
Next figuring for the missing statistic, K^:
K = earnings available to stockholders 
outstanding stock
NOI - K^(D)
K . -------5 ^ —
1.000  -  200 
h  = —
Kg = 13.3*
To view the effects of increased leverage debt is 
increased to $7,000 by retiring the appropriate amount of 
S ($3,000) in order to keep total capital constant.
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NOI
mSrket value of the firm 
less market value of D 
market value of stock
1,000
.10
10,0007.000
■TÎ005
Calculating K^:
1.000 -  350 
= -*37^
K, = 21.7)t
Thus under the NOI method as leverage is increased 
increases accordingly and and remain constant. 
Graphically these results are represented below.
NOI Theory 
Leverage and Cost of Capital
iH
:ri
D/s
is able to remain constant since it is assumed any 
increase in is equally offset by the substitution of
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lower priced D for S as a means of financing.
Leading backers of the NOI method are Franco
Modi^iani and Merton H. Miller who expounded their theory
1 Pin 1958 and have vigorously defended it since. * Since 
their presentation is used for target practice and com­
parison purposes by most financial theorists writing on 
the effects of capital structure on cost of capital, it will 
be described in detail.
Modigliani and Miller (hereafter MM) have several 
assumptions or restrictions upon which their theory is at 
least partically dependent and these mmst be recognized 
before discussion of their actual theory begins. These 
assumptions aure:
1. A free and perfect competitive market exists 
exclusive of such things as transfer costs smd irrational 
investors.
2. Althou^ it is recognized that the stream 
of profits or inccsae accruing to stockholders extends
Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "The Cost 
of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Invest­
ment." The American Economic Review. Vol. XLVIII. No. 3. 
(Juni, 195W) pp.""gri-?97.----------
^For the remainder of this paper any references to 
this basic article by Modigliani and Miller will simply 
be recognized by the appropriate page(s) in brackets 
(e.g., 1 above L261-297J).
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indefinitely into the future, it is assumed, . that
the mean value of the stream over time, or average profit 
per unit of time, is finite and represents a random variable 
subject to a (subjective) probability distribution.” [265]
3. "We shall assume that firms can be divided into 
•equivalent return’ classes such that the return on the 
shares issued by any firm in emy given class is propor- 
tionaO. to (auxd hence perfectly correlated with) the return 
on the shares issued by einy other firm in the same class.” 
[266] This means that firms can be separated according to 
their business risk, as discussed previously on page 30, 
with each member of a specific class having the sauae degree 
of business risk.
4. It is assumed that no tax effects are present. 
This assumption is lifted later when tax effects are handled 
specifically.
After making the preceding assumptions,MM set forth 
three propositions, the first stating that, " . . .  the 
market value of any firm is independent of its capital 
structure and is given by capitalizing its expected return 
at the rate pk appropriate to its c l a s s . [268] Propo­
sition I is represented by the equation:
MM define pk as the market rate of capitsLlization 
for the expected value of uncertain streams occurring in 
the class or simply the average cost of capital, K .
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Vjç « Dj + Sj = X /K^j (for any firm in class j )
Solving for K .:
T Y
Thus, ”. . .  the average cost of capital to any firm is 
completely independent of its capital structure and is 
equal to the capitalization rate of a pure equity streeun 
of its class." [268-269]
Firms with the same business risk and expected 
income stream (7) will have equal market values and stock 
prices in an equilibrium condition. According to MM, if 
the conditions of equilibrium are not present, that is if 
the total market value of two or more firms within the same 
business risk class differ due to capital structure, a 
process of arbitrage will occur to remedy the situation.
In this process rational investors substitute personal
debt for corporate debt (MM assume cost of borrowing to be 
the same for individuals and corporations) as is demon­
strated in the following example. Given two companies,
A and B, characterized by the figures below:
Co. A Co. B
7 $T750(T $T7OT
D - $4,000
Ko -iq(D) - $ 200
earnings on S $1,000 $ 800
K_ 10JÉ 12?C
S® $10,000 $6,667
V $10,000 $10,667
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Since both A and B are in the same business risk class and 
have equal expected incomes, their total values (V) should 
be equal under conditions of equilibrium. To bring about 
equilibrium ISM predict that an investor in firm B, assumed 
to have 1/100 of the outstanding shares, will arbitrage 
according to the following procedure:
1. Sell shares in Co. B for $67.
2. Borrow $40 so that his personal debt-equity ratio 
is the same as Co. B*s or 4/6.7.
3. Invest the $107 in Co. A.
4. Realizing profits -
$107 X .10 (A's K_)= $10.70 ®
less interest on $40 at ($2.00)
= $8.70 (profit from A) 
less profit he would have realized from B 
(.12 X $67) or $8.04 giving a net gain of $.66
This procedure, given the laws of a perfect market, will 
gradually drive down the value of Co. B euid increase Co.
A until the two are equal as MM say they should be.
The arbitrage process will also work if the situa­
tion between the total values of firms A and B are reversed, 
Por example, if A's giving a V of $11,111 an investor
in stock of A would sell his shares for $111 and use it 
to purchase $67 worth of B*s stock and $44 in 55̂ bonds. In 
this case the arbitrager would realize a gain of $1.24 
($10.24 - $9.00).
This process implies that investors will keep the 
V of firms with the same BR equal. There is a great deal 
of faultfinding related to this aspect of MM*s theory which
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will be covered later in the section dealing with criticism.
MM's Proposition II says that, . . the expected 
yield of a share of stock is equal to the appropriate 
capitalization rate pk [K^] for a pure stream in the class, 
plus a premium related to financial risk equal to the debt- 
to-equity ratio times the spread between pk [K^] and 
r [K^]." [271] Represented by the equation:
K^j = + (K̂ j - ) (for any firm in class j)
As demonstrated below Proposition II can be derived 
from the combination between Proposition I and the formula 
for the expected rate of return on common stock.
Proposition I
= (Koj ) (Vj ) 
since Vj = Dj +
(a) T. = + 3.)
Given the following equation for expected rate of return 
on equity: (assume all equity exists of common stock, S)
K ,  =
J
substituting (a) for in the equation above
simplifying
"0. 68,
^Use of this equation is questioned by Barges ; see
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V/hat this proposition really amounts to is that the 
increase in K as D/S increases is exactly offset by a 
decrease in brought about by the use of lower priced D 
funds; lower by
Proposition III will be set forth here but not 
referred to again in this paper since it depends upon I 
and II and does not deal directly with leverage and the 
cost of capital. This proposition concerning investment 
policy says that, ”. . .  the cut-off point for investment 
in the firm will in all cases be pk [K^] and will be com­
pletely unaffected by the type of security used to finance 
the investment.” [288]
Regarding the behavior of K^, MM go one step further 
than is the case with the basic NOI method. Normal NOI 
theory has constant throu^out all levels of leverage 
implying that higher degrees of financial risk do not 
command higher interest charges on debt. MM recognize the 
falacy of this argument and grant that may increase 
under high amounts of leverage. They claim, however, that 
such an increase in is equally offset by a decrease in 
Kg keeping constant. ”If r [K^] increases with lever­
age, the yield i [Kg] will still tend to rise as D/S 
increases, but at a decreasing rather than a constant rate. 
Beyond some h i ^  level of leverage, depending on the exact 
form of the interest function, the yield may even start to
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fall.” [274-275] The effects of such an increase in 
is pictured graphically below.
MH Theory 
Extreme leverage and Cost of Capital
dTs
This prediction by MM concerning the effects of extreme 
leverage on is another portion of their theory under 
strong attank from traditionalists and will be dealt with 
in a later section.
As presented up to this point the NOI or MM method 
has no optimal point in the capital structure, in fact 
capital structure is optimal at all points of leverage.
When taxes are introduced MM are forced to revise their 
constant position and accept an optimum capital structure
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since under tax conditions the interest paid on debt is 
not taxable.
Using the same figures as in previous examples
4- -plus the addition of an after tax capitalization rate (K ) 
equal to 79̂  and a corporate tax rate of 505t the following 
models can be constructed.
L = D/S = .8 1 = D/S = 2.7
NOI — —   rfm  '
less %(D) 200 350
taxable income 8CC opô
less T 400 325
after tax profit 400 325
add back Kj(D) ,200 jjgafter tax Income 500 675
.07 .07V  » H757T  ►
D 4.000 7.000s 4,571 2,643
Kg = NOI/V   >10.4?t
Thus under the influence of taxes the Kg declines
with increased leverage even under MM theory and in addition
the total value (V) of the firm is increased. As seen by
MM this decline is linear and would appear graphically as
shown below.
According to MM the value of a leveraged firm under 
tax conditions is represented by the following equation:
,  (1 - T ) I  t (K ,) (D )  .  „  ^ ™  1
J. ■n'C T U X
Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "Corporate 
Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital; A Correction," The 
American Economic Review. Vol. LII, No. 3, (June, 1963), 
p. 436.
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where: V-,V„ - value of levered and unlevered
Ï firmp - market capitalization rate for Z net of tauces for an unlevered firm 
r - market capitalization rate for a 
sure debt stream
Continuing, MM show that must equal + TD^ at equilibrium
and if 3* Vj + the arbitrage process will operate once
again. " . . .  'arbitrage* will make values within any class
a function not only of expected after tax returns, but of
the tax rate and degree of leverage." 1
MM Theory 
Taxes, Leverage and Cost of Capital
D/S
llbid.. p. 434.
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Prom the equation at the top of the page preceding, 
MM derive an equation for a firm’s after-tsuc cost of capital 
or earnings yield (J/V),
X = p^ - T(p* - r)^
This equation conflicts with the view held by traditionalists 
and will be covered later in the section dealing with com - 
parisons.
Viewing the graph on page 50,it is apparent that 
due to the effects of income taxes there is now an optimum 
capital structure (0), located as far to the right and 
at the hipest degree of leverage possible. Such a view 
implies that all firms should employ as much debt as 
possible in order to decrease to its lowest value. How 
then do MM explain the fact that firms in the real world 
show no efforts in this direction? They feel that the 
actual firm does not increase debt unlimitedly due to 
cheaper means of financing and the need for a safety 
margin.
. . . the existence of a tax advantage for debt 
finemcing . . . does not necessarily mean that cor­
porations should at all times seek to use the maximum 
possible amount of debt in their capital structures.
For one thing, other forms of financing, notably 
retained earnings, may in some circumstances be 
cheaper still «hen the tax status of investors under 
the personal income tax is taken into account. More 
important, there axe . . . limitations imposed by
^Ibid.. p. 439.
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lenders, as well as many other dimensions (and kinds 
of costs) in the real world problems of financial 
strategy which are not fully comprehended within the 
framework of static equilibrium models, either our 
own or those of the traditional variety. These addi­
tional considerations • . . will normally imply the 
maintenance by the corporatif of a substantial reserve 
of untapped borrowing power.'
A major threat involved with increased debt is
that the carrying charges may not be met bringing about
the danger or condition of bankruptcy. Robichek emd Myers
argue that these factors eliminate the tax advantage for
higher degrees of leverage.
These contingent bankruptcy costs, to the extent that 
they exist in fact, constitute a disadvantage partially 
or wholly offsetti^ the tax advantage of leverage.
It is our hypothesis that the present value of these 
costs will be an increasing function of leverage.2
As a result,
. . .  we would expect the market value of the firm 
to be an increasing function of leverage for firms with little or no aebt, but that the values of the 
firm ultimately declines if leverage is caxuried too far.3
They offer proof of this condition consistent with tra­
ditional theory even while assuming a perfect arbitrage 
process as under MM theory.
^Ibid.. p. 442
2Alexander A. Robichek and Stewart C. Myers, "Pro­
blems in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure," Journal 
of Finance amd Quantitative Analysis. (June, 1966), p. 16.
^Ibid.. p. 19
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Traditional Theory
Traditional theory is the name given to the third 
major opinion describing the relationship between leverage 
and the cost of capital. At present this approach seems 
to have the edge, as numbers of supporters are concerned, 
perhaps due to its somewhat compromising position and less 
idealistic assumptions. It is less idealistic specifically 
in the sense that traditional theory recognizes that there 
may be certain inequalities in the market such as trans­
action costs and higher rates of for individuals than 
for large corporations.
Traditional theory separates degrees of leverage 
into three ranges, each having a different effect upon K^. 
Throu^out the three ranges of leverage is increasing 
at an increasing rate due to investors* growing concern 
over financial risk. Subject to several variations among 
traditionalists, is generally constant through the first 
two ranges up until the beginning of range three, termed 
the critical degree of leverage. At this point begins 
to increase at an increasing rate in response to increased 
creditors* demands for more returns due to higher financial 
risks in the firm.
In the first range of leverage Kg tends to increase 
Kg but is more than offset by the substitution of 0 for 
S resulting in a decreasing Kg. During range two Kg
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continues to increase but is equally offset by the sub­
stitution of D for 8, now occurring at a slower rate than 
in range one, all causing a level function. Finally 
in range three vAiere and are both increasing is 
also forced upward.
To mathematically demonstrate the workings of 
traditional theory the following series of examples is 
presented. The first example is a debt free firm char­
acterized by the figures below.
■ NOI $ 1,000less K^(D) -
earning available to stockholders $ 1,000
K_ .10market value of stock $10,000add D
market value of firm (V) $10,000
calculating
Ko -
^o =
Ko = 10)t
For the next example it is assumed that the firm 
increases its debt from 0 to $4,000 and retires outstanding 
stock of an equal amount. is set at 5f̂  and due to the 
increased leverage is now II9Ê.
^For a debt free firm since is the only
o’element making up K .
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NOI $ 1,000
less K.(D) 200
earnings available to stockholders 8ÔÔ
K .11
market value of stock $""7727Tadd D $ 4.000
market value of firm (V) $TT757T
calculating
Kq = 8.16#
As can be seen, by increasing leverage the market value 
of the firm has increased and has decreased.
Moving on to a still higher degree of leverage, 
assume that the firm increases its D to $7,000, again 
retiring outstanding stock of the same amount. Resulting 
from the increased financial risk jumps to 14# and 
to 6#.
NOI $ 1,000
less K.(D) 420
earnings available to stockholders 58Ô
K - .14
market value of stock $ 4,l43
add D $ 7.000
market value of firm (V) $11,l43
calculating
^0 * t H t o
Eg = 8.97#
By increasing the leverage once again exactly the 
opposite results have occurred from the previous example 
following the first increase. This time the total value 
of the firm has decreased and has increased. Graphically
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Traditional Theory 
Leverage and Cost of Capital
56
D/S
Traditional theory professes that an optimal capital 
structure definitely exists. In the graph above it would 
be smywhere in range 2 since is lowest and constant in 
this area. Some traditional theorists show bottoming 
out at One specific optimal point, in such a case range 2 
would consist of this one optimal point. According to 
Solomon the
. . .  precise location of the optimal degree of lever­
age is the precise point where the rising marginal 
cost of borrowing is equal to the average overall cost 
of capital. For this purpose the marginal cost of a 
unit of debt capital must be measured as the sum of 
two things; (a) the increase in total interest payable
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on debt capital when debt is increased from B [D] to 
B* [D*]; (b) the amount of extra net earnings required 
to restore the value of the equity component to what 
it would have been under the pre-existing capitaliza­
tion rate K. which prevailed before debt is increased 
from B [D] to B*
Just where this optimal point is located, or even where the 
boundries to each range are, is dependent to a large extent 
upon the degree of risk the particular firm is associated 
with and how investors and creditors react to this risk. As 
a result there is no clear cut method of arriving at such 
values or even proving in the real world that the traditional 
method, or any of the other two for that matter, is repre­
sentative. Still real world evidence in relation to an 
optimal structure is one argument supporters give in favor 
of the traditional approach and will be dealt with more 
closely in the section including empirical evidence.
The next two sections will compare and criticize 
only the last two theories of leverage and cost of capital 
presented. The reason for this being the general lack of 
support by anyone for the NI theory. As stated previously, 
this approach relies on the assumption that risk, as seen 
by investors, does not increase in anyway as the degree of 
leverage is increased. Since this assumption is rejected 
by nearly all financial writers, disagreements center 
around the two remaining theories, the NOI held by MM and
^Bzra Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management 
(New York: Columbia tbilversiiy kess, p. §77
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the theory of modem business finance backed by tradition­
alists.
COMPARISONS
It would seem that the question of which theory of
capital structure versus cost of capital is correct could
be answered by a look at real world financial practices.
This, however, is not the case since empirical results
of such probes have been interpreted in as many ways as
there are theories and then some. MM present tests that
favor their position.
The results of these tests [an analysis of the relation 
between security yields euid financial structures] are 
clearly favorable to our hypothesis . . .  !Bhe data 
in short provide no evidence of any tendency for the 
cost of capital to fall as the debt ratio increases.
[282-284]
In contrast Schwartz and Aronson feel there is some relation
between leverage and the cost of capital since an optimal
financial structure apparently exists in the market place.
Our data . . . represent some surrogative evidence that 
in a capital market where sources of funds may be some­
what segregated, the various classes of firms have 
developed typical financial structures that are optimal 
for their operational risks and asset structures.'
Barges, after studying three industries (railroads,
cement companies and department stores) in a test of the
Eli Schwartz and Richard Aronson, "Some Surrogate 
Evidence in Support of the Concept of Optimal Financial 
Structure," The Journal of Finance. Vol. XZII, No. 1, 
(March, 1§67), p. 10.
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MX theory states that
• . • the probability of all tests indicating the same 
thing because of chance is extremely small. Thus, on 
the basis of evidence presented herein, the hypothesis 
of independence between average cost and capital 
structure appears untenable.1
Thou^ each side seems to prove their own theory 
they can't disprove their opponents, **• . . the regression
studies undertaken are simply not precise enough to con-
2stitute absolute refutation of the MM position." "Those 
who make sport with regressions have yet to show that the 
traditional position . . .  is either proven or contradicted 
by the empirical evidence available." Thus about the only 
conclusion available after studying such evidence is no 
conclusion at all due to the lack of positive and unre­
futable evidence.
When trying to compare the two views, it is helpful 
to look at one portion of their differences as recognized 
by Barges. He explains that the traditionalist views debt 
costs plus the addition to equity costs caused by debt, as 
less than the "real" cost of equity. Thus the average 
cost of capital can decrease as cheap debt is substituted 
for expensive equity. MX, however, feel that the "real" 
cost of equity funds equal cost of debt funds plus the
^Barges, The Effect of Capital Structure on the Cost
of Capital, p. lOTT 
^VanHome,
^Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management, p. 98.
 Financial Management and Policy, p. 167.
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addition to equity costs caused by debt (which is really 
a debt cost). Under this view average cost of capital can 
not be decreased throu^ the substitution of debt for equity 
since the "real" cost of each are the same.^
In presenting the two theories it was noted that 
MM believed in no optimal capital structure until tauces 
were introduced auad then only to the extent of taoc savings 
on interest and the lower risk due to the surity of the 
extra after-tax earnings. Traditional theory supports am 
optimal capital structure with or without tax bonuses be­
cause of the interaction of risks amd capital costs resulting 
in a U-shaped cost of capital function. Even under tauc 
conditions, however, when each theory predicts am optimal 
capital structure, the cost of capital as figured by MM 
and traditionalists differs. This difference is reflected 
in the after-tauc average cost of capital or earnings yield 
for a firm as viewed by each position. As presented pre­
viously on page 51 MM represent the after-tax cost of 
capital as:
Y = p^ - T(p^ - r) D
V V
The effect of income tauces on is to decrease the cost 
of capital of am unlevered firm (p ) by T(p - r)D/V. For 
example, given the following data:
^Barges, op. cit.. pp. 4-5.
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= 10*
T = 50* r = 6*
D = $ 3,000 
V = $10,000
y = pt - T(pt - r)^
y  = .10 — .5 0 (.1 0  — .06 )y ^
y  = .098
The cost of capital of an unlevered firm (p*) has been 
lowered from 10* to the after-tax average cost of capital 
of 9.8* due to the introduction of income tax as figured 
via the MM method.
In comparison the traditional theory, according to 
MM, views the equation for after-tax cost of capital in 
tax situations as;
1
P* - (P* - r)|
Under this equation cost of capital will decrease as a 
result of leverage (up to the critical point) whether income 
taxes are present or not and any such decrease will be 
larger than that figured by the MM method. For example, 
using the same figures as in the previous case, the average 
after-tax cost of capital for an unlevered firm (p*) will
^Modigliani-Miller, "Corporate Income Taxes and the 
Cost of Capital: A Correction," p. 439.
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fall from lOjC to 8.8#.
y = - (P^ - r)y
y  = .1 0  — ( .1 0  -.06 )^1^  
^ = .088
Thus MM say as an interpretation of their results 
that, "The predicted rate of decrease of 7^/V with D/V 
. . .  is still considerably smaller than under the naive 
traditional view . . ."̂
Since each theory is supported by strong arguments 
several writers have tried to accept both by offering 
explanations of possible reconciliation between them. Such 
explemations have generally been rejected by strong sup­
porters of each theory since they usually include some 
tampering with theoretical structures or assumptions.
Robichek and Myers have postulated this sort of 
explanation under dynamic conditions. They claim that 
their hypothesises present, " . . .  a plausible recon-
2ciliation of the MM logic and traditional conclusions."
To begin with optimal is defined as that degree of leverage 
where the overall value of the firm is highest, rather than
^Ibid.. p. 439.
^Alexander A. Robichek and Stewart C. Myers, Optimal 
Financing Decisions (Siglewood Cliffs. New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 44.
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that point where overall cost of capital is lowest (these 
two points need not be located at the same leverage ratio). 
Next Robichek and Myers allow expected income (X) to vary 
inversely with the amount of leverage. This relation, 
which is contrary to MM implicati<ms, is caused by the fact 
that, . . stockholders' estimates of Y [Z] may decline 
because of the possibility of the firm's having to inter­
rupt future investments in order to meet interest payments." 
By replacing Y with Y (representing the tendency of 
Y to decrease with an increase in leverage) and using it 
in MM'3 own equations, typical traditional results are 
obtained. A graph of this hypothesis is located below.
1
Robichek'3 ft Myers' Reconciliation
Expected Income ft Leverage
^ Y  (taxes)
Y(?JY
Y (taxes) (A)
  MM
 Robichek ft Myers
1Ibid.. p. 43.
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Thus it is shown that if % is allowed to vary in relation 
to leverage both the X and X after taxes will have optimum 
positions (0^, Og on graph) much the same as predicted by 
traditional theory. Robichek and Myers are unable to 
prove this hypothesis and offer it only as a plausible 
explanation until such time when more general dynamic 
theories are developed.
Weston, using a different approach, also attempts
to reconcile MM with traditional theory.
. . .  in testing Proposition 2, Modigliani and Miller 
define leverage as the ratio of debt to debt-plus-stock. 
I have found that, by taking the regression equations 
obtained by Modigliani and Miller for Proposition 2 
and changing the measure of leverage from debt to stock 
to debt-plus-stock, the regression relation becomes 
curved upward as su^^sted by traditional theory.
Thus, Proposition 2 of Modigliani and Miller reinforces 
traditional theory rather than controverts it.1
In other words MM's yield relation will change from a
straight line function to a curved function as shown in
graphs 1 and 2 below as D/V is substituted for D/S as a
measure of leverage.
Barges disagrees with Weston's analysis by 
stating that
The . . . conclusion by Professor Weston was apparently 
reached by him in an attempt to develop some kind of 
reconciliation between the MM and the traditional 
views. However, . . .  it is the opinion of this 
writer that there is no basis for reconciling the two
V. Pred Weston, "The Management of Corporate Capital; 
A Review Article," The Journal of Finance. Vol. XXXIV,
No. 2, (April, 1961), p.' i'35'.
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views. The two views are very much opposed: the one
says that debt is cheap and the other says that it is not.'
Graph 1 Graph 2
D/V
Another manner in which some writers try to recon­
cile the two diverse views is by creating two worlds for 
the theories to rule separately. Under this design King 
MH rules in the theoretical world and King Traditional 
reigns in the real world of imperfections.
Perhaps in fact such a reconciliation between 
existing theories, or the emergence of some new theory 
or additional proof for an old one my someday unify writers 
behind a single explanation of the relationship between 
capital structure amd the cost of capital. A propitiation 
of theory at present, however, seems a long way off as 
is made readily apparent in the next section summarizing 
criticisms of existing theories.
1,Barges, The Effect of Capital Structure on the 
Cost of Capital, pp. 13-H.
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CRITICISMS
Once there was a powerful king who ruled his world 
all alone until one day he was criticized and attacked by 
a new ideology which gained some support in his kingdom 
and strived for it all. The king, however, had many loyal 
followers of his own who fought back throu^ numerous 
criticisms of their own directed toward the new ideology 
which was now forced onto the defensive.
This appears to be an accurate analogy of the pre­
sent situation between MM theory and "King Traditional."
The latter has many supporters with a great deal of criti­
cism and as a result the former has mainly defended his 
original theory. Therefore, this section will consist 
mostly of criticism against MM theory.
Weston criticizes MK by charging them with the 
failure of taking into account the effects of growth in 
earnings per share. MM theory applies only to non-growth 
firms in the static sense. Based on regression analysis 
studies of data from the electric utility industry, Weston 
concludes that equity yields are negatively related to both 
leverage and growth in earnings per share. Therefore, as 
leverage increases growth decreases, causing a corresponding 
increase in equity yield which is interpreted by MM as 
being a positive function of leverage.
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When the influence of growth is isolated, the net 
influence of leverage on the cost of capital is found 
to be consistent with traditional business finance 
theory rather than the Modigliani and Miller propo­
sitions.'
This of course is a dynamic type of test of a static 
theory. Although Robichek and Myers obtain results consis­
tent with traditional theory also, they disagree with 
Weston's growth analysis.
. . .  no restrictions concerning possible growth 
patterns in operating income or assumptions about 
whether or not investors agree in their estimates of 
the future performance of firms are necessary to prove Proposition 1.2
Alexander Barges completed a full study of MM 
theory inclusive of empirical, theoretical, and procedural 
evaluations. The major criticisms that he found are:
(1) By using, as MM do, market valued debt-equity 
ratios as a measure of financial risk, many variations in 
a heterogeneous sample will not be cancelled out as they 
would if book valued debt-equity ratios were employed.
This situation will be further agitated if there is a 
lack of observations in the sample having little or no 
debt.
(2) MM's arbitrage process and their Proposition I
J. Pred Weston, "A Test of Cost of Capital Propo­
sitions,” The Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXX, No. 2, 
(October, 1963), p. ilè.
^Alexander A. Robichek and Stewart C. Myers, "Prob­
lems in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure,” Journ^ 
of Finance and Quantitative Analysis. (June, 1963), p. 13*
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are in fact dependent upon certain assumptions relating 
to investor risk, in spite of their statements to the 
contrary. In addition MM have ignored induced reactions 
which may even cause their arbitrage process to work in 
reverse.
(3) In defining expected rate of return on common 
stock in order to derive Proposition II from Proposition I 
(page 46) MM were inconsistent in that they subtracted 
current interest (definite known value) from expected future 
profits (unknown value). For theoretical purposes they 
should have used some expected average future interest 
charges consistent with X rather than the current know 
charges, E^(D).
(4) MM's Proposition II assumes that the shapes 
of investor probability distributions are not skewed.
Barges feels they may be due to the limited liability 
feature of many shares of common stock.^
Bodenhom is critical of MM's handling of risk.
Modigliani and Miller assume that the total amount 
of risk associated with the net operating income is 
independent of the financing, since risk is a function 
only of the variability of the earnings stream and this 
variability is unaffected by financial structure. 
Financial writers, however, frequently use the ratio 
of debt charges to net operating income as a measure 
of risk, because they are interested in the probability
^Barges, The Effect of Capital Structure on the 
Cost of Capital.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
that the net income will be negative and that the 
firm cannot meet its fixed charges. 1
In other words just because the variability of earnings
risk is not dependent upon capital structure does not mean
that total risk is independent because total risk may include
risks in addition to the variability of earnings risks.
Another writer who has generated extensive criticism 
of the MM theory is David Durand, who's main denouncements 
are as follows:
(1) MM state that no additional risk is incurred by 
individual investors vrtien they engage in the eurbitrage 
process, but this is not the case due to the limited liabil­
ity a creditor in a corporation enjoys in relation to the 
unlimited liability of an individual engaged in marginal 
purchases.
(2) The establishment of separate classes of firms 
according to business risk, as determined in a static sense, 
is not adaptable to the dynamic economy in the real world 
where stocks do not sell at book value.
(3) Realistically the arbitrage process of corpora­
tions and individuals is subject to many restrictions in the
2everyday market place.
Diran Bodenhom, "On the Problem of Capital Budget­
ing," The Journal of Finance. Vol. XIV, No. 4, (Dec., 1959), 
p. 485
^William J. Baumol and Burton G. Malkiel, "Ü3ie Firm's 
Optimal Debt-Equity Combination and the Cost of Capital," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. LXXXI. No. 4. (November. 
T967), pp: -------------
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The effect of one of these limitations, trans­
action costs, is studied by Baumol and Malkiel. They argue 
that a levered firm may have a hi^er value than an unlevered 
firm in the same risk class simply due to the effect of 
these costs. This results since an individual investor 
must, if he wishes to take part in the MM arbitrage process, 
incur transaction costs. For example, if an individual 
investor holds shares in a firm which provides him with more 
than the desired degree of leverage he will sell them and 
purchase shares in a less levered firm. If the value of 
the first firm were equal to the second, transaction costs 
would stop the process and therefore the unlevered firm 
must be valued lower than the levered firm.^
Solomon, as well as criticizing MM for many of the 
issues already listed, opposes MM's explanation of the 
behavior of under conditions of extreme leverage. As 
was described earlier MH state that Kg, under h i ^  leverage, 
will begin to increase at a decreasing rate and actually 
decrease if necessary in order to keep constant. Such 
a situation according to Solomon is both inconsistent with
MM's own assumptions and with the actions of normal, rational 
2investors.
William J. Baumol and Burton G. Malkiel, "The 
Firm's Optimal DebtrBquity Combination and the Cost of 
Capital." The Quarterly Journal of Econwnics, Vol. IiXXXI. 
No. 4, IvoV ^ lr r ^ m ;  p ^  547-578.-------
2Solomon, The Theory of Financial Management, pp.
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Eli Schwartz differs with MM in that he feels there 
is a definite optimum capital structure for any amount of 
equity. Given some fixed amount of ownership capital, 
equal absolute amounts of debt will result in lower debt- 
equity ratios for firms with the largest amount of equity.
For example;
Co. A Co. B(S =1.000) (S =2.000)
add D = 200 D/S = 1/5 D/S = 1/10
add D = 400 D/S = 2/5 D/S = 1/5
The addition of debt of equal amounts results in a lower
d/s for firm B, with the largest amount of S, than for firm
A. Since a lower debt-equity ratio signifies a lower
interest rate, the debt can be secured cheaper by a firm
with S = $2,000 than one with S = $1,000. Thus, tùr each
level of S and D there exists an earnings amount and this
amount can be optimized by arriving at the correct amount
of S.^
In contrast to these criticisms a recent article 
by Stiglitz is, for the most part, consistent with MM 
theory but in a more general sense. Stiglitz first high­
lights the assumptions or limitations under which the 
original MM theory operates. Next he is able to eliminate 
many of them by formulating a generalized MM theorm whose 
validity, ”, . . does not depend on the existence of risk
^Schwartz, "Theory of the Capital Structure of the 
Firm," pp. 18-39.
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classes, on the competitiveness of the capital market, or 
on the agreement of individmls about the probability 
distribution of outcomes,"^ Two assumptions that Stiglitz 
does make are (1) that individuals and firms can borrow 
at the same market rate of interest, and that (2) no firms 
go bankrupt. In later portions of the article, however, 
he does show that MM results may be valid even with certain 
limitations on individual borrowing and under certain 
specific conditions where the probability of bankruptcy 
is finite.
In disagreeing with the traditional stance, Stiglitz 
states that
If there are three or more firms in the same risk 
class, and the firms with the highest and lowest 
debt-equity ratios have the same value, then the 
value of all other firms must be the same. . , .
This result rules out the possibility of a U-shaped 
curve relating to the value of the firm to the debt- equity ratig.Z
Even if this statement is correct, however, it does not
mean that it is representative of the actual market place.
CONCLUSIONS
The majority of criticism against MM has taken 
place outside of the arena fenced in by their assumptions
Voseph E. Stiglitz, "A Re-Examinât ion of the 
Modigliauii-Miller Theorm,” The American Economic Review, 
Vol. LIX, No. 5, ( Dec ember, 15'5'9T,“ p". "IW.
^Ibid.. p. 788.
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and in most cases this outer area has been the realistic 
and imperfect world not dependent upon theoretical fences. 
There are two possible ways of looking at this situation.
One is that both opponents eure correct and in fact 
not even opponents in the sense of facing each other since 
they are standing on two different battlefields, "Realistic 
Ridge" and the "Little-Big Theory." Under this view the 
rule exists that one side cannot be attacked on the other's 
battlefield.
The other view holds that, neither a real battle 
nor a real Winner is possible until the fences can be 
broken down and all the invading variables correctly 
related to theory. Theory per se is not advantageous un­
less it can be utilized within the everyday world to solve 
problems; it must be representative suid capable of useful 
predictions and applications.
If the objective is progress there is no question 
but that the latter view is superior. Under this framework 
MM theory must be criticized and tested in the real world 
if it is to be of any use to the manager of Joe's Drive- 
In, who cannot always conform his environment to MM 
assumptions.
Research into the leverage cost of capital dispute 
has in general been of this preferred type but more is 
necessary since a dispute still exists.
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Appendix 1 
LISTING OP LEVERAGE MEASURES
1. L = ̂  (book value)
2. L = g- (market value)
3. L = y y -g (book value)
4. L = ^ g (market value)
K,
5. L = m y (flow measure)
6.
7. L =
8. L
g  ]
J _ p/annuity factor for X years_____
cask flow - annuity factor for ± years
+ yearly principle repaid
total cash flow
income before
10. L = 1 +
11. L = 1 +
12. L = 1 +
13. L net
0 -%)
x(82 - ^1)
S
ÏÏ
e
xe„ - f1
 equity eaminiçs/S 
^ =  m  after T / f  ‘
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H -  ^ = %
15. L = asî-S2H||j,|^piafiaâ
16. change in net equity eaminge caused by change
in earnings before interest after tax
L = net equity earxmuca ______
ĉ :iange in earnings before inteMSt after taxes 
earnings Wfore interest after taxes
17. L = change in earnings after interest before tax caused
by change in earnings before interest & tax
earnings after intersat before t ^  _____
change in eaûrnings before interest & taxes 
earnings before interest and tax
18. I = aebt + prefgred stock (^ook value)
19. L = debt + preferred stock (market value)
equity
20- ^ = debi -lue)
21. ^ = debt ^alue)
total interest + dividends on preferred22. L  -------:--------- S5T?--------- -̂-------
+ div. on pref.
+ div. on pref.
^ ~ EbiT - (K, + div. on pref.)
^ div(EBIT -Ka - — ) C1^)
25. L -
- div. on pref.
EBIT - - div. on pref. y  EBIT
“ equity /  equity + b + preferred/ stock
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/ div. on pref A / S3I1?(1-T)  
?7. L = lEBIT - ^  J /equity + debt +
 —  ëquiVy------  / preferred stock
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